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Petty Offenses, Serious Consequences: Multiple Petty
Offenses and the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial
Jeff E. Butler
We cannot exclude recognition of a scale of moral values according to
which some offenses are heinous and some are not. ... To the discriminating judgment there is also a difference between a maximum of ten
days in jail and the risk of five years' imprisonment. What about
three months? What about six months? Here we reach the everlasting enigma in law and in life: When is far too far?l

Although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to jury
trial for all criminal defendants? the Supreme Court long has held
that certain criminal offenses are not serious enough to trigger this
right.3 Since petty4 offenses such as traffic violations and small-time
misdemeanors are not worth the public expense of empaneling a
jury, the Court has held that these offenses may be tried before a
judge without violating the Sixth Amendment. The existence of
this "petty-offense exception" to the right to jury trial never has
been seriously challenged,5 but the scope of the exception repeatedly has been the subject of judicial scrutiny.
1. Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HAR.v. L. REv. 917, 981 (1926).
2. See U.S. CaNST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed ....").
The right to jury trial is guaranteed in Article III as well as the Sixth Amendment. See
U.S. CaNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 ("The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
be by Jury ...."). The scope of the Article III guarantee, however, is considered identical to
that of the Sixth Amendment. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 971; George
Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No Peers/, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 245, 260 (1959). Although the
arguments herein apply to both guarantees, this Note refers only to the Sixth Amendment.
3. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) ("So-called petty offenses were tried
without juries both in England and in the Colonies and have always been held to be exempt
from the otherwise comprehensive language of the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions."); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552 (1888) ("(W]hen it is declared that the party is
entitled to a speedy trial by an impartial jury • • . [i]t could never have been intended to
embrace every species of accusation involving either criminal or penal consequences."); see
also Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 979 ("The Supreme Court, therefore, has given
emphatic recognition to the common-law and colonial exemption of 'petty offenses' from the
constitutional requirement of jury trial. The implication of exemption is itself part of the
Constitution."). But see Kaye, supra note 2, at 273 (arguing that the petty-offense exception
cannot be squared with the plain language of the Constitution).
'
4. The words petty and serious are used as Sixth Amendment terms of art throughout this
Note. When these words are used to express their ordinary meaning, they will appea~; in
quotation marks.
·
5. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158 ("(W]e hold no constitutional doubts about the practic~s
... of accepting waivers of jury trial and prosecuting petty crimes without extending a ri~t to
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In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 6 the Supreme Court set
forth the definitive standard for distinguishing petty offenses from
serious crimes.7 The benchmark used by the Court is the maximum
prison term assigned to each offense by the legislature. Where the
penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment, the offense is serious
enough to trigger the right to jury trial. Where the penalty is six
months' imprisonment or less, there is a strong presumption that
the offense is petty; therefore, a defendant accused of that offense
has no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.
The Blanton decision, however, provides little guidance in a case
where multiple offenses, each of which otherwise would be considered petty, are joined together in a single trial. In such a case, no
individual offense would have a statutory penalty of more than six
months' imprisonment, but a conviction on all charges could expose
the defendant to a lengthy prison term without the opportunity to
invoke the procedural safeguards of a jury trial.8 Lower courts
have responded to the problem of applying the Blanton standard to
multiple petty offenses in three different ways. Some courts apply
the standard to each offense individually, regardless of whether
other offenses are joined on the same charging instrument.9 Others
add up the possible penalties for all joined offenses and assume that
the right to jury trial exists whenever the six-month limit is exceeded by the aggregate potential penalty.lo Still others refuse requests for jury trial unless the sentence imposed for all offenses in
fact will exceed six months' imprisonment.11
jury trial."); United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512,1515 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("[I]t is not our
function to even question the validity of the petty-offense exception."). Indeed, the judiciary
probably could not function without the petty-offense exception:
For example, 83,092 petty offenses, 56,763 of which were traffic offenses, were disposed
of by United States Magistrates in 1987. The federal judiciary, as it is presently constituted, cannot conduct over 83,000 jury trials in one year for this one class of cases in
addition to the jury trials that are required for serious criminal cases and civil cases.
926 F.2d at 1515 (citation omitted).
6. 489
538 (1989).
'_1. The standard more appropriately would be called the Baldwin-Blanton standard. In
United States v. Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Court held for the first time that a statutory
offense having a maximum penalty exceeding six months' imprisonment automatically triggers the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. This case left open the question of whether an
offense with a maximum penalty of less than six months can trigger the Sixth Amendment
Blm:zton considered that issue and held that such offenses are presumed petty. For the sake
of brevity, this Note refers to the six-month standard that is central to both of these cases as
tlie' Blanton standard.
. 8,. This Note assumes that the right to jury trial always favors defendants who, of course,
:.ritay waive the right whenever it appears advantageous to do so. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 158
("['i']he fact is that in most places more trials for serious crimes are to juries than to a court
alone; a great many defendan~ prefer the judgment of a jury to that of a court.").
e.g., United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512 (lOth Cir. 1991).

u.s.

.
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This Note argues that a criminal defendant accused of multiple
offenses has no Sixth Amendment right to jury trial unless one or
more of the offenses - considered individually - is serious under
the Blanton standard. Part I explores one principal that pervades
the Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the petty-offense exception: community preferences determine whether a criminal
charge is petty or serious; The Court measures community preferences by looking to the maximum penalty set by the legislature; if
no statutory penalty exists, then the Court uses the sentence imposed by the judge as a substitute. Part II argues that, for multiple
petty offenses, the Blanton standard should be applied to each offense individually because this is the only approach consistent with
the Court's petty-offense-exception jurisprudence. Therefore, this
Note concludes that multiple petty offenses do not trigger the Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial.

I.

WHAT MAKES A PETTY OFFENSE

PETTY?

The Supreme Court has offered several principles for distinguishing petty offenses from serious crimes. At first inspection,
these principles may seem contradictory. This Part argues, however, that careful examination of the Court's decisions reveals a hierarchy among them. Section I.A explores the fundamental
principle that community preferences determine whether an offense
is petty or serious and argues that the consequences for a particular
defendant should not determine whether an offense is petty or serious. Section I.B asserts that the maximum penalty set by the legislature for criminal offenses is the best indicator of community
preferences. Section I.C argues that, absent a maximum penalty set
by the legislature, the sentence imposed by the judge is the secondbest indicator of community preferences.

A. Community Preferences
The principle that community preferences12 determine whether
a criminal charge is petty or serious recurs throughout the Supreme
12. The phrase "community preferences" is a composite of various phrases employed by
the courts and commentators to denote the public's perception of the "seriousness" of an
offense. In Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969), the Supreme Court used the
phrase "the seriousness with which society regards the offense" to express this concept. This
language has been quoted in subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Blanton v. City of
North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538,541 {1989); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 {1970). This
Note uses "community preferences" to avoid any confusion resulting from the use of the
term serious to express both society's judgment concerning an offense and the constitutional
status of that offense.
The most complete definition of "community preferences" is suggested by Frankfurter
and Corcoran in the following passage:
In subjecting certain conduct to the summary procedure of magistrates, unguarded by '
the popular element, there was an exercise of moral judgment dividing behavior into·
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Court's petty-offense-exception jurisprudence. Th~ Court first recognized the connection between community preferences and the
petty-offense exception in District of Columbia v. Clawans.13 Since
that decision, the Court frequently has reiterated the need to link
the application of the petty-offense exception to community
preferences.14
This principle follows directly from the need for efficient allocation of the right to jury trial. The petty-offense exception exists because this right is too expensive for the public to finance in every
criminal prosecution. Efficient allocation of this scarce resource demands that the right to jury trial be reserved tor defendants accused
of crimes "serious" enough to merit expensive procedural safeguards.15 Because the public bears the cost of conducting jury trials, the public also should decide where to draw the line between
petty and serious crimes.
The principle that community preferences determine whether a
criminal offense is petty or serious has an important corollary: consequences for individual defendants should not determine whether
charges trigger the right to jury trial. Deference to community preferences follows logically from the need for efficiency in allocating
the scarce right to jury trial. No such justification exists for condiserious affairs and minor misdeeds.... Broadly speaking, acts were dealt with summarily
which did not offend too deeply the moral purposes of the community, which were not
too close to society's danger, and were stigmatized by punishment relatively light.
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 980-81. For other formulations of this concept, see
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (referring to the "community['s] ...
social and ethical judgments"); Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1549 (lOth Cir. 1983) (referring to "the opprobrium that society attaches to the crime charged"); United States v.
Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) (referring to "the general normative judgment of the
seriousness of an offense").
13. 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) ("Doubts must be resolved ... by objective standards such as
may be observed in the laws and practices of the community taken as a gauge of its social and
ethical judgments." (emphasis added)). Implicit recognition of this principle dates back further still. Earlier Supreme Court cases decided whether an offense was petty or serious by
looking to common law practices. But the common law status of an offense depended on
whether summary disposition had been authorized by the British Parliament for that offense.
See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 932-33. Thus, community preferences concerning an offense were incorporated directly - via Parliament - into the common law status of
the offense as petty or serious.
14. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 ("In recent years, however, we have sought more 'objective indications of the seriousness with which society regards the offense.' " (emphasis added));
~aldwin, 399 U.S. at 68 ("In deciding whether an offense is 'petty,' we have sought objective
criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense •. ••"(emphasis adaed)); Frank, 395 U.S. at 148 ("In determining whether a particular offense can be classified
as .'petty,' this Court has sought objective indications of the seriousness with which society
regards the offense." (emphasis added)); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.145, 160 (1968) ("The
penalty authorized by the law of the locality may be taken 'as a gauge of its social and ethical
jUdgments' of the crime in question." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
, ,15. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 ("[T]he possible consequences to defendants from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to efficient
law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability of
sp,e~dy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications.").
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tioning this right on the consequences facing individual defendants.
A "serious" consequence to one defendant may be a trivial imposition on another.16 Therefore, if the seriousness of an offense or set
of offenses is determined according to how "serious" individual defendants view a potential sentence, the right to jury trial will be
allocated haphazardly - wasted on some defendants and denied
unjustly to others.
The Supreme Court has endorsed this corollary almost as frequently as it has endorsed the principle itself. In Clawans, the
Court stated that the sympathy of a judge for a particular defendant
should carry no weight in deciding whether to allocate the right to
jury trialP In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 1B the Court stated specifically that the threat of a lengthy prison sentence alone is not sufficient to trigger the right to jury trial. In both Blanton v. City of
North Las Vegas and Baldwin v. New York, the Court recognized
that a defendant sentenced to six months' imprisonment is unlikely
to view this sentence as a "petty" consequence but nevertheless endorsed the rule that a six-month sentence does not trigger the right
to jury trial.1 9 Indeed, the strict six-month rule in Blanton itself
contradicts any notion that consequences to the defendant should
be weighed in deciding whether an offense is petty or serious.
This corollary also finds support in the history of the pettyoffense exception. The exception evolved from the practice in England and the American colonies of denying the right to jury trial for
certain offenses recognized as "petty" by the legislature.2 o When
16. The converse is also true. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73 ("Indeed, the prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or
'petty' matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his
reputation.").
17. See C/awans, 300 U.S. at 628 ("Doubts must be resolved, not subjectively by recourse
of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by objective standards .... ").
18. 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ("[W]e plainly cannot accept petitioners' argument that a
[defendant] is entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong possibility exists that he will face
a substantial term of imprisonment upon conviction, regardless of the penalty actually
imposed.").
19. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1989); Baldwin, 399
U.S. at 73.
·
20. In their classic defense of the petty-offense exception, Frankfurter and Corcoran describe the practice in England at the time of American colonization as follows:
Thus drastically limited does the right of trial by jury seem to have been known to Englishmen for two centuries preceding the separation of the colonies. Alongside of trial
before the popular tribunal was trial by magistrates. There were crimes and crimes. The
great dividing line was the use of a jury. The settled practice in which the founders of
the American colonies grew up reserved for the justices innumerable cases in which the ·
balance of social convenience, as expressed in legislation, insisted that proceedings be ·
concluded speedily and inexpensively.
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 933. Although restricting its use in various ways,
the American colonies retained the English custom of nonjury adjudication. See id. at 936
("Despite these differences, all the colonies, to some extent at least, re-lived the experience
of the mother country, and resorted to summary jurisdiction for minor offenses with ·full
loyalty to their conception of the Englishman's right to trial by jury.").
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the Constitution was adopted, courts assumed that these common
law exceptions were incorporated into the Sixth Amendment.21
The application of these exceptions depended entirely on statutory
dictates and common law precedent, not on the consequences facing a particular defendant. Indeed, many of the offenses considered
"petty" at common law carried penalties that would be considered
"serious" by today's standards.zz
B. The Maximum Statutory Penalty
The Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized that the best
measure of community preferences concerning a criminal offense is
the maximum penalty23 set by the legislature.2 4 The assumptions
21. See id. at 969 ("The exclusion of [the] 'petty offense' had been, as we have seen, the
accepted doctrine of the colonies and thereafter in the states . . . . The makers of the Constitution took all this history and practice for granted.").
22. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 626 {1937) ("[T]here were petty
offenses, triable summarily under English statutes, which carried possible sentences of imprisonment for periods from three to twelve months."); see also Frankfurter & Corcoran,
supra note 1, at 932-33 (listing petty offenses from English common law, some of which carry
penalties of corporal punishment or imprisonment for up to one year).
23. The penalty authorized by the legislature includes not only the authorized prison term
but also any other penalty authorized by the legislature, such as a fine or probation. In
Blanton, Melvin Blanton was charged with drunk driving which, under Nevada law, carried a
maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment, a maximum $1,000 fine, a mandatory penalty
of attendance at an alcohol-abuse education course, and an automatic 90-day driver's license
suspension. See 489 U.S. at 539-40. The Court first concluded that the maximum period of
incarceration was insufficient to trigger a right to jury trial. See 489 U.S. at 543. The Court
next considered whether any of the other penalties implied that the community viewed drunk
driving as a serious offense.
A defendant is entitled to a jury trial in such circumstances only if he can demonstrate
that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a "serious" one. This standard, albeit somewhat
imprecise, should ensure the availability of a jury trial in the rare situation where a
legislature packs an offense it deems "serious" with onerous penalties that nonetheless
"do not puncture the 6-month incarceration line."
489 U.S. at 543 (quoting Brief for Petitioners). The Court concluded that none of the additional penalties rendered the offense serious and that no constitutional right to trial by jury
therefore existed. See 489 U.S. at 543-44.
Since the decision in Blanton, few penalties other than the maximum prison term have
been held sufficiently serious to trigger the right to jury trial. Compare United States v.
Nachtigal, 113 S. Ct. 1072 (1993) {holding that a $5,000 fine and alternative of 5 years' probation did not render an offense serious) with Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir.
1990) (holding that a 15-year driver's license suspension rendered an offense serious) and
State v. Wiltshire, 491 N.W.2d 324 (Neb. 1992) (same).
24. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) ("[T]he judgment about the
seriousness of the crime is normally heavily influenced by the penalty authorized by the legislature ••.•"); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) ("In deciding whether an offense
is 'petty,' we have sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness with which society regards the offense, and we have found the most relevant such criteria in the severity of the
maximum authorized penalty." (citations omitted)); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149
(1969) {"In ordinary criminal prosecutions, the severity of the penalty authorized, not the
penalty actually imposed, is the relevant criterion."); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159
(1968) ("[T]he penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major relevance in determining
whether it is serious or not •.. .");see also Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 (quoting Baldwin).
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underlying this rule are that the legislature is in the best position to
gauge societal preferences25 and that the legislature fixes the maximum penalty for an offense based on how "serious" society regards
the offense.26 The maximum statutory penalty, therefore, is relevant to the allocation of the right to jury trial because there is a
logical relationship between the statutory penalty and community
preferences.27
The practice of looking to the maximum statutory penalty to
determine whether this right attaches is a relatively recent innovation. Early Supreme Court cases followed the haphazard approach
of distinguishing between petty and serious offenses by reference to
English common law.28 Subsequent decisions modified this ap25. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42 ("The judiciary should not substitute its judgment as
to seriousness for that of a legislature, which is 'far better equipped to perform the task, and
[is] likewise more responsive to changes in attitude and more amenable to the recognition
and correction of their misperceptions in this respect.'" (alteration in original) (quoting
Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1209 (5th Cir. 1988))).
26. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541 ("In fixing the maximum penalty for a crime, a legislature 'include[s] within the definition of the crime itself a judgment about the seriousness of
the offense.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Frank, 395 U.S. at 149)); Duncan, 391 U.S. at
162 n.35 ("[A] legislative judgment as to the seriousness of the crime is imbedded in the
statute in the form of an express authorization to impose a heavy penalty for the crime in
question.''); see also United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 24 (9th Cir. 1981) ("An offense is
not 'serious' because it is severely punished; it is severely punished because it is 'serious.' ").
27. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390-91 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("The relevance of the sentence, as we have seen, is that it sheds light on the seriousness with
which the community and the legislature regard the offense."); United States v. Coppins, 953
F2d 86, 89 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he most relevant objective indicator is now recognized as
being the severity of any maximum penalty that may have been legislatively authorized, reflecting as that does a legislative, hence societal, judgment about the seriousness of the offense."); see also Frank, 395 U.S. at 157-59 (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that probation
statute penalties should not be used to determine whether offenses are petty because Congress did not intend that these penalties apply to any particular offense).
28. In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888), the Supreme Court first recognized that the
petty-offense exception evolved out of common law practices. Justice Harlan wrote:
The third article of the Constitution provides for a jury in the trial of 'all crimes, except
in cases of impeachment.' The word 'crime,' in its more extended sense, comprehends
every violation of public law; in a limited sense, it embraces offenses of a serious or
atrocious character. In our opinion, the provision is to be interpreted in the light of the
principles which, at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given class of
cases, was entitled to be tried by a jury.
127 U.S. at 549. Taking as its premise that the petty-offense exception evolved from a practice predating the Constitution, the Court concluded that only those offenses exempted from
trial by jury at common law could be called petty. All other offenses triggered the right to
jury trial. Justice Harlan wrote,
Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the
common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for
that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution,
conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United States, secures
to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court,
he is put on trial for the offence charged.
127 U.S. at 557. Following this decision, courts determined whether a defendant could assert
a constitutional right to jury trial by researching common law practices. If the offense could
be tried summarily at common law, no constitutional right to jury trial existed. If the common law offense required trial by jury, then that right was guaranteed by the Sixth Amend-
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proach to avoid dependence on murky common law precedents. In
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 29 the Court held that the severity
of the potential penalty could transform an offense considered petty
at common law into a serious offense.30 Thus, the Court departed
from mechanical adherence to common law precedent in determining whether an offense was petty or serious.
More recent Supreme Court decisions have abandoned entirely
the use of common law precedent to distinguish between petty and
serious offenses. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 31 the Court concluded
that the maximum statutory penalty alone may indicate that an offense is serious, thus triggering the right to jury trial. Justice White
wrote, "the penalty authorized for a particular crime is of major
relevance in determining whether it is serious or not and may in
itself, if severe enough, subject the trial to the mandates of the Sixth
Am.endment."32 Subsequent decisions interpreting the pettyoffense exception cite Duncan for the proposition that the maximum penalty set by the legislature should play a primary role in
deciding whether an offense is petty or serious.3 3
C.

The Sentence Imposed

The rule that the maximum penalty set by the legislature is the
best indicator of community preferences cannot apply in cases
where no maximum statutory penalty exists for an offense. For example, in many jurisdictions criminal contempt has no maximum
statutory penalty.34 To deal with this problem, the Supreme Court
ment. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930) (holding that reckless
driving triggered the right to jury trial because "[i]t was an indictable offense at common
law").
29. 300 u.s. 617 (1937).
30. See 300 U.S. at 625 ("[T]his Court has refused to foreclose consideration of the severity of the penalty as an element to be considered in determining whether a statutory offense,
in other respects trivial and not a crime at common law, must be deemed so serious as to be
comparable with common law crimes, and thus to entitle the accused to the benefit of a jury
trial prescribed by the Constitution.").
31. 391 u.s. 145 (1968).
32. 391 U.S. at 159.
33. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970).
34. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 n.35 ("[C]riminal contempt is unique in that legislative
bodies frequently authorize punishment without stating the extent of the penalty which can
be imposed."); see also Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 & n.1 (1969) (noting the
various federal criminal contempt provisions); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 206 n.8 (1968)
(describing state criminal contempt provisions).
Criminal contempts always have been treated as a unique class of offenses under the Sixth
Amendment. Early Supreme Court cases denied the right to trial by jury to those accused of
criminal contempt, regardless of the punishment; involved. Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165 (1958), summarizes the logic of these early eases. The Supreme Court noted that when
the Constitution was created it had been common practice in England and colonial America
to try contempt charges summarily, see 356 U.S. at 184-86, and then stated:
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stated an alternative rule for criminal contempts in Bloom v.
Illinois. 35 In cases where no maximum statutory penalty exists for a
criminal offense, the sentence imposed by the judge is the best indicator of community preferences regarding the offense.3 6
The principle that criminal contempts of court are not required to be tried by a jury
under Article III or the Sixth Amendment is firmly rooted in our traditions. . •• In
various respects, such as the absence of a statutory limitation of the amount of a fine or
the length of a prison sentence which may be imposed for their commission, criminal
contempts have always differed from the usual statutory crime under federal law. As to
trial by jury and indictment by grand jury, they possess a unique character under the
Constitution.
356 U.S. at 187.
A few years after Green, the Supreme Court began to waver in its conviction that the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial did not apply to criminal contemners. In United States
v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964), the Court declined to create a general right to jury trial for
those accused of criminal contempt but hinted in a footnote that the Constitution might bar
courts from imposing substantial penalties for criminal contempt without affording defendants the right to trial by jury. See 376 U.S. at 695 n.12 ("Some members of the Court are of
the view that, without regard to the seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary trial
without a jury would be constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty offenses.").
In Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), the Court again declined to extend a
constitutional right to jury trial to all criminal contemners. But, in the exercise of its supervisory power, the Court barred federal courts from imposing sentences of more than six
months' imprisonment for criminal contemners unless they had been afforded the opportunity for a jury trial. See 384 U.S. at 380.
In 1968, the Supreme Court finally abolished the per se rule that criminal contemnors
have no right to jury trial under the Sixth Amendment in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194
(1968).
[W]e are acutely aware of the responsibility we assume in entertaining challenges to a
constitutional principle which is firmly entrenched and which has behind it weighty and
ancient authority. Our deliberations have convinced us, however, that serious contempts are so nearly like other serious crimes that they are subject to the jury trial provisions of the Constitution, now binding on the States, and that the tradittonal rule is
constitutionally infirm insofar as it permits other than petty contempts to be tried without honoring a demand for a jury trial.
391 U.S. at 197-98.
35. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). The rule in Bloom is not, strictly speaking, a rule for criminal
contempts. Criminal contempts that have been assigned a statutory penalty by a legislature
are not evaluated by the sentence imposed but by the maximum penalty. See infra text accompanying notes 40-43 (discussing Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216
(1968)).
36. See Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211 ("[W]hen the legislature has not expressed a judgment as
to the seriousness of an offense by fixing a maximum penalty which may be imposed, we are
to look to the penalty actually imposed as the best evidence of the seriousness of the
offense.").
This rule is counterintuitive. How can the right to jury trial, which must be allocated at
the outset of trial, depend on the sentence eventually imposed, which is not known until the
end of trial? The answer is that the rule functions by imposing limits on sentencing discretion. If a judge denies a motion for jury trial, then the sentence imposed cannot exceed six
months' imprisonment. If, after hearing the evidence, the judge wishes to sentence the defendant to more than six months, then the judge must grant a new trial or else the sentence
will be reduced on appeal. The Court made the practical impact of this rule clear in Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). Justice White wrote:
It is argued that a State should not be permitted, after conviction, to reduce the sentence
to less than six months and thereby obviate a jury trial. The thrust of our decisions,
however, is to the contrary: in the absence of legislative authorization of serious penalties for contempt, a State may choose to try any contempt without a jury if it determines
not to impose a sentence longer than six months. We discern no material difference
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A cursory reading of the Bloom decision suggests that the Court
based its decision on the consequences facing the defendant, rather
than community preferences. The sentence imposed, after all, is the
consequence facing the defendant. The Bloom rule, however, did
not result from sympathy for defendants facing a sentence of more
than six months' imprisonment.37 The sentence imposed is relevant
to the right to jury trial because it represents the judge's estimation
of community preferences regarding a particular offense.3 s Therefore, the rule that, under some circumstances, the sentence imposed
may determine the right to jury trial is not an exception to the principle that community preferences determine whether a criminal offense is petty or serious.
The rule in Bloom also is not an exception to the rule in Duncan
that the maximum statutory penalty set by the legislature is the best
indication of community preferences. The two rules simply apply to
different fact situations.39 The statutory penalty controls the right
to jury trial whenever a maximum statutory penalty exists for a
charged offense. In the absence of such, the sentence imposed controls. In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co., 40 the Court
stated the hierarchical relationship between these two rules in clear
terms. The petitioner, Wayne Dyke, was convicted of criminal contempt which, pursuant to a Tennessee statute, carried a maximum
penalty of ten days' imprisonment. Not surprisingly- given the
short sentence involved - the Court held that Mr. Dyke had no
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. The Court stated that the basis for this outcome was the statutory penalty, not the sentence imposed. Justice White wrote,
Alleged criminal contemnors must be given a jury trial, therefore, unless the legislature has authorized a maximum penalty within the
"petty offense" limit or, if the "legislature has made no judgment about
between this choice and permitting the State, after conviction, to reduce a sentence to
six months or less rather than to retry the contempt with a jury.
418 U.S. at 496. The important point to understand is that, by this circuitous route, the right
to jury trial is allocated only to those defendants who, in the eyes of the judge, have committed offenses worthy of a "serious" penalty.
37. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ("[W]e plainly cannot accept
petitioners' argument that a contemnor is entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong
possibility exists that he will face a substantial term of imprisonment upon conviction, regardless of the punishment actually imposed.").
· 38. See Frank, 395 U.S. at 149 ("[T]his court has held that in prosecutions for criminal
contempt where no maximum penalty is authorized, the severity of the penalty actually imposed in the best indication of the seriousness of the particular offense.").

)9. In fact, the decisions in Bloom and Duncan were both handed down on May 20, 1968,
and both majority opinions were authored by Justice White. The decisions are printed consecutively in the official reporter. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Bloom, 391
u.~:. at 194.
·
40. 391 u.s. 216 (1968).
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the maximum penalty that can be imposed, unless the penalty actually
imposed is within that limit.41
Under this formula, the Duncan rule for offenses with a maximum

statutory penalty takes precedence over the Bloom rule for offenses
without a maximum.42 Therefore, in most circumstances, the maximum statutory penalty controls the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial.
The same conclusion regarding the hierarchy between the statutory penalty and the sentence imposed can be inferred by the
Supreme Court's repeated statement that objective criteria of community preferences are preferable to subjective criteria.4 3 Statutory
penalties are more objective because they are based on the experience of numerous legislators, presumably elected precisely because
they are in touch with the preferences of society.44 Sentences imposed are more subjective because they normally are based on an
individual judge's discretion.
II.

JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO MULTIPLE PETIY OFFENSES

The Supreme Court's use of two different rules for measuring
community preferences has been a source of confusion for lower
courts trying to apply the petty-offense exception to multiple petty
offenses. Further complicating matters, lower courts sometimes apply these rules mechanically, losing sight of the overarching principle that community preferences must determine whether an offense
- or set of offenses - is petty or serious. This Part explores the
disagreement among lower courts concerning application of these
rules to situations where multiple petty offenses are joined for trial.
Courts have adopted three different methods for determining
whether multiple petty offenses trigger the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial. The methods are similar in that they each incorporate
the six-month standard articulated by the Supreme Court in
Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas. The methods disagree, how41. 391 U.S. at 219-20.
42. See also Frank, 395 U.S. at 149 & n.2 (qualifying the rule that, for criminal contempts,
the sentence imposed is the best indication of community preferences by stating, "[i]f the
statute creating the offense specifies a maximum penalty, then of course that penalty is the
relevant criterion"); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 162 n.35 (arguing that the sentence imposed is irrelevant "where a legislative judgment as to the seriousness of the crime is imbedded in the
statute in the form of an express authorization to impose a heavy penalty for the crime in
,
question").
43. See United States v. Nachtigal, 113 S. Ct. 1072, 1073 (1993); Blanton v. City of North
Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Frank, 395
U.S. at 148; District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) ("Doubts must be
resolved, not subjectively by recourse of the judge to his own sympathy and emotions, but by
objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the comniunity
taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments.").
44. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42.
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ever, concerning how penalties associated with a set of offenses
should be evaluated under the six-month standard.
First, some courts argue that the maximum penalty for each offense charged should be compared individually to the six-month
standard, regardless of whether the offense is joined with other offenses.45 This approach is called the "Individual Penalty Approach."46 The Second Circuit adopted this approach in United
States v. Lewis. 41 Ray Lewis was charged with two counts of obstructing the mail, an offense punishable by six months' imprisonment. A judge convicted Mr. Lewis on both counts and sentenced
him to three years' probation.48 Mr. Lewis appealed the conviction,
arguing that his Sixth Amendment right to jury trial had been violated because the aggregate penalty that the judge could have imposed following a conviction on both counts exceeded the sixmonth Blanton standard.49 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction noting that, under the rule in
Blanton, the right to jury trial depends upon indications from Congress that the offense in question is serious. The court concluded
that "[b]ecause Congress has given no indication that multiple offenses are more serious by virtue of their multiplicity than are single offenses of the same nature, the right to a jury trial cannot
depend upon the maximum potential aggregate term of
incarceration."50
Second, some courts argue that the aggregate of the maximum
penalties for all joined offenses should be compared to the sixmonth Blanton standard.51 This approach is called the "Aggregate
45. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252,254-55 (2d Cir. 1995); City of Fort Lauderdale
v. Byrd, 242 So. 2d 494, 497 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); see also United States v. Coppins, 953
F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); cf. Scott v. District of Columbia, 122
A.2d 579,581 (D.C. 1956) (applying this approach to the right to jury trial under District of
Columbia law); City of Monroe v. Wilhite, 233 So. 2d 535, 536 (La. 1970) (same under Louisiana law); State v. James, 415 P.2d 543, 546 (N.M. 1966) (same under New Mexico law).
46. Courts adopting the approaches described in this section use inconsistent terms - or
no term at all -to describe their approaches. This Note adopts a uniform descriptive set of
terms. In the case of the Individual Penalty Approach, no court has named this method of
applying the Blanton standard.
47. 65 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1995).
· 48. See 65 F.3d at 253. Although the Second Circuit adopted the Individual Penalty Approach knowing that Mr. Lewis had been sentenced to probation, the approach also has been
adopted where the defendant was sentenced to a fine, see Wilhite, 233 So. 2d at 535, and
where the sentence was not yet determined, see Byrd, 242 So. 2d at 494.
No court has applied the Individual Penalty Approach to deny a defendant the right to
jury trial and then sentenced that defendant to more than six months' imprisonment. Such
an outcome, however, would be consistent with the approach.
49. See Lewis, 65 F.3d at 253•
. . 50. 65 F.3d at 253; see also United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991)
(Nirqteyer, J., dissenting) ("This is the case where multiple zeros still add up to zero.").
51. See Coppins, 953 F.2d at 89-90; United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382-83 (10th
Cir. 1973), modified, Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547 (lOth Cir. 1983); United States v.
Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231, 233 (W.D. Va. 1988); United States v. Coleman, 664 F. Supp.
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Penalty Apptoach."52 The Fourth Circuit adopted this approach in
United States v. Coppins. 53 Mildred Coppins was charged with simple assault, assault by beating, and trespassing - all in connection
with a scuffle with police at the entrance of a military base.
Although the three offenses carried a maximum aggregate penalty
of 15 months' imprisonment, Ms. Coppins was denied a jury trial,
convicted by a judge, and sentenced to pay a fine of $170. On appeal, Ms. Coppins argued that the aggregate penalty, not each offense individually, should have been compared to the six-month
Blanton standard to determine whether she was entitled to jury
trial. The Fourth Circuit agreed, remanding the case for a jury trial
notwithstanding the fact that the sentence actually imposed - a
$170 fine - implied that the trial judge regarded the set of offenses
as petty.
Third, some courts argue that no Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial exists unless the sentence eventually imposed on the defendant
exceeds the six-month Blanton standard.S4 This approach is called
the "Sentence Imposed Approach."55 The Ninth Circuit adopted
this approach in Rife v. Godbehere. 56 William Rife was charged
with three counts of a misdemeanor punishable by up to six
months' imprisonment.57 After denying Mr. Rife's motion for jury
trial, the trial judge convicted Mr. Rife on all three counts and sentenced him to one year in prison.ss Mr. Rife appealed the convic548, 549 (D.D.C. 1985); United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1987);
see also United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1522 (lOth Cir. 1991} (Ebel, J., dissenting).
52. This approach also has been called the "objective approach." See Bencheck, 926 F.2d
at 1517; Haar, 708 F.2d at 1553.
53. 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991).
54. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1512; Rife, 814 F.2d at 563; Haar, 708 F.2d at 1547; Bruce v.
State, 614 P.2d 813 (Ariz. 1980); see also Maita v. Whitmore, 508 F.2d 143 (9th Cir. 1974)
(adopting the Sentence Imposed Approach for multiple criminal contempts where each
count has a maximum statutory penalty of six months' imprisonment).
55. This approach also has been called the "subjective approach." See Bencheck, 926
F.2d at 1518; Haar, 708 F.24 at 1553.
56. 814 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987). Although this case predates the Blanton decision, it
came after the six-month ceiling on petty offenses was announced in Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66 (1970). Since Blanton effectively expanded the scope of petty offenses, there is
no reason to think that the outcome in Rife would be different today. For a post-Blanton
decision adopting the Sentence Imposed Approach, see Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1512.
57. See Rife, 814 F.2d at 564. Rife was charged with unlawful use of the telephone to
terrify, intimidate, threaten, annoy, or harass, which is a class-one misdemeanor. See Aruz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-2916 (1989). Class-one misdemeanors are punishable by up to si~
months' imprisonment. See Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-707 (1989).
'
58. The initial sentence also included six years' probation and a $3,000 fine. See Rife~814
F.2d at 564. Although Rife's initial sentence was "serious" under the Blanton standard, ot}Jer
cases adopting the Sentence Imposed Approach have involved restrictions or putative restrictions on the sentencing discretion of the trial judge.
·· '
Haar was the first case to adopt the Sentence Imposed Approach for statutory offe,hse·s.
Stephen Haar was convicted of two petty offenses in a magistrate proceeding and sentenced
to six months in prison. On trial de novo, the district court denied Mr. Haar's request for a
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tion twice and eventually his sentence was reduced to six months.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial
judge may have violated Mr. Rife's Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial by sentencing him to more than six months but that this violation was remedied when the sentence was reduced on appeal.59
This Part compares the reasoning behind each of these judicial
approaches to Supreme Court doctrine regarding the petty-offense
exception explored in Part I. Section ll.A argues that the Individual Penalty Approach is consistent with Supreme Court principles.
Section II.B argues that the Aggregate Penalty Approach conflicts
with the principle that community preferences determine whether a
criminal charge is petty or serious. Section II.C argues that the Sentence Imposed Approach is contrary to the rule that the statutory
penalty set by the legislature is the best indication of community
preferences.

A. The Individual Penalty Approach
The Individual Penalty Approach is consistent with both the
principle that community preferences determine the seriousness of
an offense or set of offenses6o and the rule that the maximum penalty set by the legislature is the best indicator of community preferences.61 Courts adopting this approach apply the six-month
Blanton standard to each offense charged, regardless of whether an
offense is joined with other offenses. The result is that a defendant
charged with multiple offenses has a right to jury trial only if at least
one of the offenses charged is punishable by more than six months'
imprisonment. Because the Individual Penalty Approach is a literal
jury trial because, pursuant to a local court rule, the court could not impose a sentence
greater than that previously imposed by the magistrate. Owing to this procedural quirk, Mr.
Haar faced a sentence of no greater than six months' imprisonment. The Tenth Circuit affirmed Mr. Haar's nonjury conviction, holding that "a defendant is entitled to a jury trial for
multiple petty offenses ... only if he is actually threatened at the commencement of trial with
an aggregate potential penalty of greater than six months' imprisonment." Haar, 708 F.2d at
1553.
Bencheck is another example of the Sentence Imposed Approach. Kevin Bencheck was
charged with several offenses - each having a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment- stemming from a traffic stop near a military base. The judge denied Mr. Bencheck's
motion for jury trial, promising him that under no circumstances would he be sentenced to
more than six months in prison. After convicting Mr. Bencheck on four offenses, the judge
sentenced him to a total of 10 days in jail. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding
that denial of the right to jury trial is "not repugnant to the United States Constitution" as
long as the sentence imposed does not exceed the six-month Blanton standard. Bencheck,
926 F.2d at 1520.
'59. See Rife, 814 F.2d at 565. In effect, the court held that as long as the sentence eventually imposed does not exceed six months' imprisonment, a trial judge is free to deny a motion
for' jury trial. If the sentence imposed following a bench trial exceeds six months, then the
defendant is entitled to a sentence reduction or a new trial before a jury. See supra note 36.
· ' 60~ See supra section I.A.
61. See supra section I.B.
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application of the Blanton rule for nonjoined offenses, it is facially
consistent with the principles of petty-offense-exception
jurisprudence.
Critics of the Individual Penalty Approach argue that it allows
"serious" sentences to be imposed without triggering the right to
jury trial. Defendants facing like consequences from criminal
charges ought to be treated alike under the Sixth Amendment. For
example, a defendant facing five years' imprisonment for multiple
petty offenses should have the same right to jury trial as one facing
five years' imprisonment for a single offense.
Though intuitively appealing, this argument's focus on the consequences to the defendant contradicts the fundamental principle
that the right to jury trial must be allocated according to community
preferences. This principle implies that the right to jury trial should
not be allocated according to the consequences facing individual
defendants.62 For this reason, the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly that the consequences to individual defendants should not control the right to jury trial.63
The argument that "serious" penalties alone should trigger the
right to jury trial also ignores the fact that, under any rule for multiple offenses, the rule in Blanton allows "serious" penalties to accrue
without triggering the right to jury trial. For example, suppose that
a defendant convicted of a petty offense and sentenced to six
months in prison commits a second petty offense while incarcerated.64 In the trial on the second offense,65 the defendant could not
assert the right to jury trial based on the fact that he is already in
prison because the rule in Blanton forecloses the possibility of looking beyond the maximum penalty of the offense charged.66 If the
defendant is convicted on the second charge and sentenced to an
62. See supra section I.A.
63. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974) ("[W)e plainly cannot accept
petitioners' argument that a contemnor is entitled to a jury trial simply because a strong
possibility exists that he will face a substantial term of imprisonment upon conviction •••• ");
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968) ("[T]he possible consequences to defendants
from convictions for petty offenses have been thought insufficient to outweigh the benefits to
efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial administration resulting from the availability
of speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications."). This conclusion also is implicit in the
oft-repeated statement that objective measures of seriousness must be preferred over subjec·
tive ones. See supra note 43.
64. Incarceration is not essential to the example. Under the same logic used in this example, the defendant might commit the second offense soon after being released or even many
years later. Regardless of the total amount of time involved, the defendant will still serve a
total of a year in prison based on two petty offenses.
65. Of course, the two offenses cannot be joined for trial because the defendant already
has been convicted of the first offense. But this is not a necessary ingredient of the example.
"Serious" penalties also could result where a prosecutor declines to join two alleged offenses,
and the defendant has no statutory right to joinder. See infra text accompanying notes 89-91.
66. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) ("A defendant is
entitled to a jury trial ... only if he can demonstrate that .•. statutory penalties .•. are so
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additional six months behind bars, he will spend a total of a year in
prison - a "serious" penalty - for committing two petty offenses.67 Because the Blanton rule itself creates the possibility of a
"serious" penalty resulting from multiple petty offenses, the possibility of a "serious" penalty alone cannot be sufficient to trigger the
right to jury trial.68
Critics of the Individual Penalty Approach also argue that it
fails to reflect community preferences in situations where a set of
related offenses is regarded as more serious than the same set of
unrelated offenses. The classic example of this situation is felony
murder. Causing an accidental death during the course of committing a felony is far more serious in the eyes of society than causing
an accidental death and committing a felony on two different occasions.69 The same phenomenon exists in the context of petty offenses. For example, speeding through a red light likely would be
regarded by society as more serious than speeding and running a
red light on two different occasions. Critics argue that the Individual Penalty Approach fails to account for this difference in community preferences. Therefore, the approach does not trigger the right
to jury trial for some sets of offenses regarded as serious by society.
But this argument overlooks the fact that legislatures do account for some situations where sets of related offenses are more
serious than sets of offenses committed in isolation by defining independent offenses that incorporate sets of lesser offenses. The felony murder rule is the perfect example. Because society believes
that causing a death during the commission of a felony is more serious than causing death and committing a felony on two different
occasions, legislatures have passed .laws authorizing an enhanced
severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense in question is a
'serious' one.").
67. In theory, there is no limit to the amount of time a defendant could spend in prisonwithout the benefit of a jury trial - based solely on the commission of petty offenses.
68. The Individual Penalty Approach affects only the right to jury trial under Article III
and the Sixth Amendment and therefore is compatible with due process limits on prison
sentences that may be imposed without a jury trial. It would be an odd argument, of course,
to claim that due process requires a broader right to trial by jury than the explicit guarantee
contained in the Sixth Amendment.
This approach also has no impact on the right to jury trial under state constitutions or
under federal or state statutes. Indeed, there is nothing to prevent a legislature from passing
a statute enhancing the maximum penalty for multiple petty offenses in order to trigger this
right under Blanton. Cf. United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252,255 (2d Cir. 1995) (arguing that
18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994), which states the general rule in federal sentencing that
"[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently," implies that
Congress views multiple offenses as no more serious than a single offense). For these reasons, critics of this approach may be mollified by the fact that limits may be placed on "serious" consequences flowing from petty offenses without doing violence to settled pettyoffense-exception jurisprudence.
69. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AuSTIN W. Scorr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5 (2d
ed. 1986 & Supp. 1995) (discussing the history and application of the felony murder rule).
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penalty for this combination of offenses.7o By the same token, legislatures have passed laws against reckless driving which may be
invoked to impose an enhanced penalty against a driver, such as
one who speeds through a red light egregiously violating the rules
of the road.71 Thus, the objection that the Individual Penalty Approach does not account directly for community preferences concerning certain sets of related offenses is tempered by the fact that
legislatures indirectly account for such situations by creating new
offenses with enhanced penalties.n
The fact that legislatures define some serious crimes so that they
include sets of petty offenses raises yet another concern. Critics argue that the Individual Penalty Approach offers a new opportunity
for prosecutorial abuse by allowing a serious crime to be broken
down into a set of petty offenses for the purpose of imposing a "serious" sentence without triggering the right to jury trial. For example, a person suspected of punching a victim five times with the
intent of inflicting grievous bodily injury may be charged with one
count of aggravated assault, a serious offense, or with five counts of
simple assault, a petty offense. Under the Individual Penalty Approach, the prosecutor can dictate the suspect's Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial through the exercise of his charging discretion. By
charging a set of petty offenses instead of a single serious offense,
the prosecutor effectively can eliminate the defendant's right to jury
trial.73
Although the charging discretion of the prosecutor is always
susceptible to abuse, the risk that a suspect in fact will receive an
unjust "serious" penalty based on multiple petty offenses is limited.
A bench trial does not imply an unfair trial.74 In order for a prosecutor to succeed in imposing a "serious" penalty for petty offenses,
the trial judge must cooperate with the prosecutor's efforts. Only if
the judge convicts the defendant on enough counts, imposes long
enough sentences for each offense, and orders the sentences to be
70. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1994) (including felony murder in the definition of firstdegree murder).
71. See, e.g., N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAw § 1212 (McKinney Supp. 1995).
72. See United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("Only when one charge is elevated in seriousness by the existence of the other, such as
under a recidivism statute, would multiple charging cause the elevation of the seriousness of
a single offense. And in those cases, the statutorily enhanced sentence resolves the analysis."
(citation omitted)).
73. This scenario could give rise to the ironic defense of vindictive nonprosecution. Cf. 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PRocEDURE§ 13.5(a) (1984 & Supp.
1991) (discussing the defense of vindictive prosecution).
74. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968) ("We would not assert, however,
that every criminal trial - or any particular trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or
that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.").
Indeed, some argue that nonjury trials may be fairer than jury trials. Cf. 391 U.S. at 188-89
{Harlan, J., dissenting).
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served consecutively will the prosecutor accomplish his goal of imposing a "serious" sentence based on multiple petty offenses. As a
result, the risk of negative consequences to the defendant arising
from this variant of prosecutorial abuse is probably small.
B. Aggregate Penalty Approach

The Aggregate Penalty Approach contradicts the principle that
community preferences determine whether a criminal offense is
petty or serious.75 This approach triggers the right to jury trial
whenever the aggregate penalty for a set of joined, petty offenses
exceeds the six-month Blanton standard. Although courts adopting
this approach pay lip service to the importance of community preferences,76 they do not suggest any reasonable basis for concluding
that the aggregate penalty is related to community preferences concerning the set of offenses. Without some link between the aggregate penalty and community preferences, the Aggregate Penalty
Approach cannot be squared with petty-offense-exception
jurisprudence.
For individual offenses, a logical connection exists between community preferences and the allocation of the right to jury trial.
When a legislature sets the maximum penalty for a statutory offense, it includes within that penalty an assessment of community
preferences concerning the offense.77 Because legislators are constantly in touch with their constituents, and legislators can modify
statutory penalties whenever public sentiment shifts,78 courts reasonably can assume that the maximum statutory penalty accurately
reflects community preferences. The reasonableness of the sixmonth Blanton standard depends on this logical connection.79
Without a direct correlation between legislative action and community preferences, the Blanton standard would be senseless - allocating the right to jury trial solely on the basis of legislative whim.
When statutory penalties are aggregated, the cause-and-effect
relationship between community preferences and the maximum
penalty disappears. No advocate of the Aggregate Penalty Approach has argued that legislatures in fact consider the various ways
in which penalties might be aggregated when setting the maximum
penalty for particular offenses. But, unless legislatures do assign
maximum penalties with aggregation in mind, the crucial link con75. See supra section I.A (discussing community preferences).
76. See Coppir.s, 953 F.2d at 89; United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D.
Ga. 1987).
77. See supra note 26.
78. See supra note 25.
79. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989).
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necting community preferences to the maximum penalty is absent. 80
For this reason, courts adopting the Aggregate Penalty Approach
run the risk of allocating the right to jury trial without reference to
community preferences.
Even if aggregate penalties are not connected directly to community preferences through the legislature, advocates of the Aggregate Penalty Approach still argue that aggregation provides the
best estimate available of community preferences concerning sets of
petty offenses.s1 If a set of petty offenses, considered as a whole,
generally is more serious than any one of the offenses making up
the set,82 the Aggregate Penalty Approach, though imperfect, may
be the best available method for estimating the difference between
the seriousness of an individual petty offense and the seriousness of
a set of petty offenses.
The problem with this "best estimate" argument is that the Aggregate Penalty Approach does not trigger the right to jury trial for
all sets of offenses that have an aggregate penalty exceeding six
months but only those sets that have been joined for trial. The aggregate penalty for a particular set of offenses is the same regardless of whether the constituent offenses have been joined.
Therefore, if this approach is justified by its ability to gauge public
sentiment regarding a set of offenses, then joined and nonjoined
offenses should be treated alike. But joined and nonjoined offenses
80. Even if a legislature did construct a scheme of maximum penalties designed to be
aggregated by the courts - an enormously difficult endeavor given the possibility that any
offense may be joined with any other offense - the question of whether such an artificial
scheme actually reflects community preferences would remain. There is no reason to assume
that community preferences aggregate as easily as maximum terms of imprisonment.
81. Thus far, only one court has cast the argument in terms of estimating community
preferences. See Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1552 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("The aggregate of
the statutorily prescribed penalties provides the objective indicia of the opprobrium that soci·
ety attaches to the entire criminal act and is thus the appropriate measure of the act's serious·
ness."). That court, however, rejected the Aggregate Penalty Approach in favor of the
Sentence Imposed Approach. See 708 F.2d at 1553. Courts that have adopted the Aggregate
Penalty Approach usually justify it by arguing that potential consequences to the defendant
are "serious" whenever the aggregate penalty exceeds six months. See, e.g., United States v.
Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382 (lOth Cir. 1973) ("We believe that the defendants can view as no
less serious a possible penalty of a year in prison when charged with two offenses arising out
of the same act, transaction, or occurrence, than if charged with one offense having a potential penalty of one year's imprisonment."). This justification, however, plainly contradicts the
principle that consequences to the defendant should not determine whether an offense is
petty or serious. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
82. No advocate of this approach explicitly argues that society always regards a set of
offenses as more serious than the sum of the individual constituent offenses. Indeed, such a
proposition would be difficult to establish. For example, society's judgment concerning two
parking violations is probably identical to its judgment concerning one parking violation. See
United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Congress has not indicated that
multiple offenses for which a defendant is prosecuted jointly are necessarily any more serious
in their aggregate than the most serious individual offense."). For this reason, it is a common
practice for courts to impose concurrent sentences, especially in the petty offense context.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994).
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must be treated differently because, under Blanton, a set of nonjoined offenses may not trigger the right to jury trial even if the
aggregate penalty exceeds six months' imprisonment.83
In response to this problem, advocates of the Aggregate Penalty
Approach could argue that society considers joined sets of offenses
to be more serious than nonjoined sets of offenses. But there is no
reason to believe that community preferences are related to the decision to join offenses.84 Joinder is simply a procedural device
designed to promote efficiency in the courts.ss Community preferences concerning a set of offenses are not related to the decision to
join those offenses for trial.s6 The prosecutor's decision to join offenses for trial is normally influenced only by concerns about efficiency in the presentation of evidence and fairness to the
defendant.8 7
The arbitrary distinction between joined and nonjoined offenses
under the Aggregate Penalty Approach also creates a perverse incentive for prosecutors to refuse to join offenses in order to avoid
expensive jury trials.ss Joinder of offenses may be desirable for the
defendant as well as the prosecutor.s9 But if joinder itself creates
expensive procedural rights - as it does under the Aggregate Pen83. See, e.g., Lewis, 65 F.3d at 255 (noting, in a case with multiple petty offenses that the
Government could have tried separately, that the defendant himself "admit[ted] that under
such a circumstance he would not have been entitled to a jury trial").
84. See 65 F.3d at 255 ("The mere fact that the government chose to consolidate the
charges provides no greater justification for a jury trial than if the charges were tried
separately.").
85. See City of Fort Lauderdale v. Byrd, 242 So. 2d 494, 497 {Fla. Dist. a. App. 1970)
{"The joinder of offenses for purposes of trial is a procedural device designed to promote
efficiency and convenience and has nothing to do with the nature of the individual offense as
serious or petty."); State v. James, 415 P.2d 543, 546 (N.M. 1966) ("The consolidation of the
petty offenses for trial does not change their nature, nor can they when combined be classed
as a felony."), overruled by State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 46 (N.M. 1990); see also United
States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86,91 {4th Cir.1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("Simply because
the offenses were tried together or on one charging document is, in my judgment, irrelevant
to the constitutional inquiry."); 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.1(a).
86. Even if prosecutors did attempt to estimate community preferences when deciding
whether to join offenses, such subjective speculation has been proscribed specifically by the
Supreme Court. In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 {1988), the Supreme
Court stated that "the judiciary should not substitute its judgment as to seriousness for that
of a legislature." 489 U.S. at 541. Arguably, the same admonition applies to members of the
executive branch. After all, individual prosecutors have no better insight into community
preferences than individual judges. Therefore, attempts by a prosecutor to account for community preferences when deciding whether to join offenses probably would not be regarded
by the Supreme Court as objective indications of seriousness. Cf. 489 U.S. at 541 {"In recent
years, however, we have sought more 'objective indications of the seriousness with which
society regards the offense.' ").
87. See 2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.1(a), at 354.
88. The prosecutor always has discretion, as an initial matter, to refuse to join related
offenses. See 2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.3{a). The court may choose to consolidate related indictments or informations sua sponte. See 2 id. Note that private parties have
no authority to force the prosecutor to charge offenses all at once. See 2 id. § 13.3(a).
89. Professors LaFave and Israel describe the advantages of joinder as follows:
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alty Approach - prosecutors will avoid joining offenses and, instead, charge each offense in a separate indictment or
information.9° This result is the worst of all possible worlds for the
defendant, who is both denied the right to jury trial for the set of
offenses and denied the advantages of a single trial for all related
charges.
C. Sentence Imposed Approach

The Sentence Imposed Approach contradicts the rule that the
maximum penalty set by the legislature is the best indication of
community preferences. In sentencing a person convicted of multiple offenses, a judge does provide an indication of community preferences concerning the set of offenses charged. The Supreme Court
has deferred to this subjective judgment where the crime is criminal
contempt because no statutory indication of community preferences exists for that offense. But for offenses carrying a maximum
statutory penalty, the Supreme Court consistently has held that the
legislature's estimation of community preferences must be preferred to that of the judiciary.9t
Advocates of the Sentence Imposed Approach argue that the
rule in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania92 should control in cases where
multiple petty offenses are joined for trial.93 In Codispoti, the
Supreme Court considered the question of whether multiple criminal contempts, arising out of a single trial, trigger the Sixth AmendThe provisions permitting joinder of related offenses have generally been favorably
viewed by commentators, for such joinder may have substantial advantages for both the
prosecution and the defendant: "The joint trial of offenses that share common factual
circumstances enables the state to avoid the duplication of evidence required by separate trials, to reduce the inconvenience to victims and witnesses, to minimize the time
required to dispose of the offenses • . • . A single trial will eliminate the harassment,
trauma, expense, and prolonged publicity of multiple trials. A single trial may result in a
faster disposition of all cases, may increase the possibility of concurrent sentences in the
event of conviction, and may prevent the application of enhanced sentencing statutes."
2 LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 73, § 17.1(a) (quoting 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR C!uMINAL
JUSTICE § 13·2.1 cmt. (2d ed. 1980)).
90. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Moreover, the question
of Lewis's right to a jury trial could have been obviated altogether had the government cho·
sen to simply charge both counts of obstructing the mail in separate informations."); United
States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) ("If each petty
offense were charged in a separate charging document and tried separately, the defendant
would be tried by the court each time, even if the sentences on each were imposed
consecutively.").
91. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937).
92. 418 u.s. 506 (1974).
93. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 {lOth Cir. 1991); Rife v.
Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1987). But see Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547,
1550 n.14 (lOth Cir. 1983) (stating that Codispoti has "limited precedential value ..• because
of the unusual nature of criminal contempt charges").
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ment right to jury trial.94 Dominick Codispoti acted as his own
counsel in a criminal trial that resulted in a conviction. During the
course of the trial, he was charged with seven counts of criminal
contempt. Mr. Codispoti's motion for a jury trial was denied, and
he eventually was convicted of all seven counts of criminal contempt.95 Although Mr. Codispoti was not sentenced to more than
six months for any single contempt charge, his sentence aggregated
to more than three years in prison.96 The Supreme Court rejected
the contention that each count of criminal contempt was a separate
petty offense97 and held that the rule in Bloom v. Illinois9B controls
where multiple charges of criminal contempt arise out of a single
trial.99 Thus, Mr. Codispoti improperly was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial because the sentence imposed exceeded six months in prison.
Advocates of the Sentence Imposed Approach argue that,
although the maximum penalty fixed by the legislature provides a
clear, objective indication of community preferences for individual
offenses, no legislative indication of community preferences exists
for sets of offenses. Therefore, multiple petty offenses are analogous to multiple criminal contempts, and, following Codispoti, the
sentence imposed by the judge provides the best indication of community preferences.
This reasoning, however, ignores the fact that legislatures do
identify "serious" sets of petty offenses by defining crimes with enhanced statutory penalties that incorporate multiple petty offenses.100 By defining serious crimes that may be charged in lieu of
sets of petty offenses, legislatures provide an objective indication of
community preferences regarding certain sets of petty offenses.
94. Codispoti is the only Supreme Court case addressing the problem of applying the
petty-offense exception to multiple offenses joined for trial.
95. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 507-09. Initially, Mr. Codispoti was convicted summarily
on all seven counts by the judge that presided over his criminal case and received a sentence
of 7-14 years in prison. Although the convictions were affirmed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455 (1971), and remanded the case for retrial before a different judge. It was only at this
point that Mr. Codispoti had the opportunity to request a jury trial. See 418 U.S. at 507-08.
96. See 418 U.S. at 509.
97. See 418 U.S. at 517 ("We find unavailing respondent's contrary argument that [Mr.
Codispoti's] contempts were separate offenses and that, because no more than a six months'
sentence was imposed for any single offense, each contempt was necessarily a petty offense
triable without a jury.").
98. 391 U.S. 194 (1968). Bloom was the first case to recognize that criminal contempts
trigger the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. The rule in Bloom is that, where no maximum statutory penalty exists for an offense, the sentence imposed determines whether an
offense is petty or serious. For a discussion of Bloom, see supra section I. C.
99. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517 ("In terms of the sentence imposed, which was obviously several times more than six months, [Mr. Codispoti] was tried for what was equivalent
to a serious offense and was entitled to a jury trial.").
100. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.

894

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 94:872

Some sets of petty offenses are "serious," and they may be charged
as a single serious offense.101 Other sets of petty offenses can be
charged only as multiple petty offenses. Since legislatures do respond to community preferences in some cases by fashioning "serious" penalties for multiple petty offenses, courts should assume
that legislatures also are responding to community preferences
when they decline to create "serious" penalties for other sets of
petty offenses.
Even if legislatures did not provide enhanced penalties for "serious" sets of petty offenses, the rule in Codispoti would be inapposite for multiple statutory offenses because some indication of
community preferences exists in the maximum penalty for each offense. The rule for criminal contempts in Bloom, which was
adopted in Codispoti, applies only to criminal contempts where no
statutory penalty exists.102 In cases where a statutory penalty does
exist, the Supreme Court uniformly has held that the sentence imposed is irrelevant as a measure of community preferences.lo3 Applying the rule in Codispoti to multiple statutory offenses,
therefore, ignores the Supreme Court's repeated admonition to
avoid substituting the judicial measures of community preferences
for those of the legislature.104
Advocates of the Sentence Imposed Approach also argue that it
protects defendants from overzealous prosecution by ensuring that
sentences exceeding six months in prison are not imposed without a
jury tria1.10s The overarching purpose of the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial is to protect defendants against oppression by the
government.1°6 The Sentence Imposed Approach bows to this fundamental principle by providing this right whenever a "serious"
penalty is imposed.
Reliance on the purpose behind the right to jury trial, however,
ignores the necessity of drawing a reasonable line - firmly
grounded in the principles underlying the petty-offense exception
101. For example, legislatures could define a single serious offense that would encompass
all multiple petty offenses, such as by creating a recidivist statute.
102. See Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 219-20 {1968).
103. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,
149 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35 (1968).
104. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989); District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937).
105. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1519 (lOth Cir. 1991) ("[T]here is a
need for interposing the common sense judgment of a jury between the government and the
defendant ...."); Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1552 (lOth Cir. 1983) ("The approach
thus protects the defendant from vindictive prosecution, interposing the jury between the
government and the defendant in all cases where there is a risk of serious punishment and a
consequent possibility of prosecutorial abuse.").
106. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56.
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- between offenses that trigger the right and those that do not. 107
Nobody can deny that the right to jury trial is a procedural safeguard designed to benefit defendants. But the need to exempt the
least serious offenses from a blanket right to jury trial is equally
well-established.1os Deference to the overarching purpose of this
right would imply that the petty-offense exception always should be
construed narrowly. The Supreme Court, however, specifically has
repudiated this view by repeatedly declining invitations to restrict
application of the petty-offense exception.1°9 Because the purpose
behind the right to jury trial - the desire to provide a procedural
safeguard to criminal defendants - stands fundamentally opposed
to the existence of a petty-offense exception, it provides little guidance to courts seeking to draw lines defining the scope of that
exception.
Underlying both of these arguments in favor of the Sentence
Imposed Approach is the common-sense idea that multiple petty
offenses and single serious offenses should be treated alike under
the Sixth Amendment because, from the defendant's point of view,
it makes no difference whether a lengthy sentence results from one
offense or multiple offenses.110 This notion, however, contradicts
the fundamental principle that community preferences determine
whether a criminal offense is petty or serious and its corollary, that
the consequences to the defendant should not determine the seriousness of a criminal offense.l11 Although it may seem reasonable
to treat defendants facing identical sentences alike under the Sixth
Amendment, the Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that the
107. See 391 U.S. at 160-61 ("[I]t is necessary to draw a line in the spectrum of crime,
separating petty from serious infractions. This process, although essential, cannot be wholly
satisfactory, for it requires attaching different consequences to events which, when they lie
near the line, actually differ very little.").
108. See supra notes 3, 5.
109. See United States v. Nachtigal, 113 S. a. 1072, 1074 (1993) (denying the right to jury
trial even though the maximum penalty for the offense in question was set by the Secretary of
the Interior); Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538,543 (1989) (denying the right
to jury trial even though mandatory penalties other than the maximum period of incarceration could have been considered "serious"); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)
(denying the right to jury trial even though the defendant initially was sentenced to more
than four years in prison); Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147,148 (1969) (denying the right
to jury trial even though the defendant was sentenced to three years' probation); District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617,625-26 (1937) (denying the right to jury trial even though
the defendant was sentenced to 90 days in prison).
110. See United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1518 (lOth Cir. 1991). Justice White
made an analogous observation when arguing that all individual offenses having a statutory
penalty of greater than six months' imprisonment necessarily trigger the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial. See United States v. Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) ("One who is
threatened with the possibility of imprisonment for six months may find little difference between the potential consequences that face him, and the consequences that faced appellant
here.").
111. See supra section I.A.
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scarce right to jury trial cannot be allocated according to the
mercurial concerns of individual defendants.112
CONCLUSION

The petty-offense exception is something of an anomaly in Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. It is justified by the practical need for
the efficient allocation of scarce judicial resources, at the expense of
the democratic ideals which counsel broad application of the right
to jury trial. Because the petty-offense exception runs counter to
democratic instincts, it is particularly important that it be applied in
a reasoned manner.
Efficient allocation of the right to jury trial requires courts to
assess community preferences concerning an offense or set of offenses in order to determine whether this right attaches for a given
defendant. Of the three approaches for allocating the right to jury
trial to defendants accused of multiple offenses, only the Individual
Penalty Approach gives due regard to community preferences. The
other approaches extend the right to a jury to cases where the legislature has expressed the community's unwillingness to endure the
expense that a jury trial entails. These approaches. thus ignore the
Supreme Court's command that courts heed community preferences regarding the seriousness of criminal offenses. Consequently,
courts should adopt the Individual Penalty Approach so that scarce
judicial resources are not wasted.

112. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.

